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This book identifies an important topic--namely, that knowledge should not be understood as an 
inner representation of the external world--and takes an original approach to it. The 
representationalist, Cartesian understanding of knowledge has many critics these days, and 
here Warren Frisina begins to pull them together critically to sketch a path to an alternative, 
nonrepresentational theory. His book has three parts: (1) a critical examination of Charles 
Taylor, Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, and Daniel Dennett as examples of thinkers in 
Continental philosophy, analytic philosophy, postanalytic philosophy, and cognitive science, 
respectively, engaged in the quest for a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge; (2) a 
constructive section that draws on John Dewey's pragmatism, Alfred North Whitehead's process 
philosophy, and Wang Yang-Ming's neo-Confucianism to develop Frisina's own more 
metaphysically adequate nonrepresentational theory; and (3) three chapters defending and 
illustrating his proposal. 
What is a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge? According to such a view, knowing 
something does not have to do with mental images of the outer world. Rather, to say that one 
knows something is, in the first place, a statement that one can interact with it successfully. 
Frisina says (following Wang) that knowledge and action are "one thing"; he also says that 
knowledge is a "form" or a "way" of action. Such hints will need to be developed, and 
presumably Frisina would do so in terms of people's capacities, dispositions to behave, and 
"know how." There is plenty of work to be done on these emerging questions. Another issue to 
be addressed concerns the variety of positions that critique representationalism. For example, 
Frisina contrasts his nonrepresentational approach with Rorty's antirepresentational approach, 
but he does not make it clear whether he holds that knowledge is not primarily representational 
or that knowledge is not representational at all. Following Andy Clark's arguments that accounts 
of cognition cannot eschew representations completely--for example, when speaking of 
knowledge of objects that are not present--I recommend the former. 
What is distinctive about Frisina's approach is his argument, sustained throughout his book, that 
"one of the things hanging up our attempt to get past representational theories of knowledge is 
a refusal to address... basic metaphysical questions" (p. 4). Frisina is convincing: it is confused 
for nonrepresentationalists to argue that there is no purely mental/subjective realm to be set 
over against a purely physical/objective realm but then to claim that the implications of this 
concern only the mental realm. The assumption that a nonrepresentational theory will concern 
epistemological questions about the subjects of knowledge while avoiding (or worse, 
eliminating) metaphysical questions about the objects of knowledge clearly maintains the very 
dualism that it seeks to overcome. 
So, what kind of metaphysics best suits a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge? Frisina 
argues for an organicist or panpsychist metaphysics in which everything that exists interacts 
with its environment without having an independent, inner self. With Dewey, Wang, and 
especially Whitehead, Frisina argues that "existence is inherently relational, that to be anything 
at all is to be a perspective on that which already is, that 'being' is actually the process of 
coming to develop such a perspective, and most important, that the process of developing such 
a perspective is ultimately value-laden" (p. 152). On this view, there is no ontological difference 
between the mind and the rest of the natural world, for human minds are rooted in and arise 
from simpler forms of organic activity and everything that exists is constituted by interested 
behavior in its environment. Given this continuum between the human and the nonhuman, 
Frisina's metaphysical position turns out to be more fully naturalistic than those who treat the 
mind as just "there." His position also overcomes dualisms--for example, between public and 
private uses of language, between sensations and cognition, between propositional knowledge 
and embodied know-how--dualisms that antimetaphysicians like Rorty still defend. Moreover, 
Frisina's naturalistic metaphysics is not closed to the value of spiritual practice (represented 
here by Confucian self-cultivation). 
Frisina's use of pragmatist, process, and neo-Confucian philosophies marks his approach as 
not part of mainstream philosophy today; to use the term he uses for Robert C. Neville, Frisina 
is an "outsider." But those interested in this project will find more support in the work of 
Francisco Varela and his colleagues, who make a similar case for the embodied mind and the 
idea that thinking is enactive, that is, "not the representation of pregiven world by a pregiven 
mind but... rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of 
actions that a being in the world performs" (Varela et al., The Embodied Mind [Cambridge, 
Mass., 1992], p. 9). My point is not simply that Varela bolsters Frisina's work but that Varela 
makes his case for the unity of thought and action by drawing on cognitive science, Buddhist 
meditative practice, and phenomenology--three traditions in addition to the three that inform 
Frisina's work. And one can add philosophers of mind such as John Haugeland who explicitly 
oppose representational theories of knowledge or existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre, who said 
that "knowledge and action are only two abstract aspects of an original concrete relation" (Being 
and Nothingness [New York, 1956], p. 308). Given a broader perspective of contemporary 
philosophical approaches to knowledge, one sees that Frisina is limning a significant point of 
convergence for a variety of philosophical movements, and that he is doing so in a way that, 
though naturalist, may be congenial to some forms of religious thought. 
 
